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(forthcoming	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  Green	  Bag	  2014)	  
	  
	  
	   This	  has	  been	  a	  watershed	  year	  for	  the	  Federal	  Circuit.	  The	  Chief	  Judge,	  who	  
had	  gained	  a	  reputation	  for	  commenting	  publicly	  about	  pending	  legislation	  and	  
cases,	  resigned	  after	  a	  scandal	  involving	  the	  appearance	  of	  favoritism	  towards	  a	  
lawyer	  who	  appears	  before	  the	  court.	  The	  Circuit	  fared	  no	  better	  in	  the	  more	  
traditional	  measure	  of	  approval	  from	  the	  court	  above.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  granted	  
certiorari	  in	  six	  patent	  cases	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  this	  term—the	  largest	  
number	  the	  Justices	  have	  accepted	  since	  the	  Circuit’s	  creation	  in	  1982.	  Moreover,	  in	  
case	  after	  case	  this	  year,	  the	  Justices	  soundly	  and	  unanimously	  rejected	  the	  Federal	  
Circuit’s	  logic.	  	  
To	  what	  should	  one	  attribute	  this	  cascade	  of	  unwanted	  attention	  from	  above?	  
Some	  attribute	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  a	  
clash	  between	  rules	  and	  standards.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  
craves	  structured	  rules	  that	  can	  be	  followed	  by	  all	  players,	  while	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
demands	  more	  subtle	  and	  flexible	  standards.	  	  
Characterizing	  these	  struggles	  as	  a	  debate	  about	  rules	  and	  standards	  misses	  
the	  heart	  of	  the	  conversation	  that	  is	  occurring.	  Rather,	  a	  strong	  message	  echoes	  
through	  the	  six	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions.	  It	  is	  a	  message	  about	  restraint,	  about	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carefully	  constructed	  logic,	  and	  about	  coming	  into	  the	  fold	  of	  judicial	  decision-­‐
making.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  itself	  is	  always	  successful	  in	  
following	  these	  aspirational	  goals.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  message	  is	  clear.	  This	  is	  a	  
coming	  of	  age	  for	  the	  Federal	  Circuit—or	  at	  least	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  seems	  
determined	  to	  coax,	  cajole	  and,	  when	  necessary,	  club	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  into	  coming	  
of	  age.	  
This	  article	  examines	  the	  messages	  evident	  in	  recent	  Supreme	  Court	  
decisions	  and	  evaluates	  whether	  the	  Court	  appears	  to	  be	  gaining	  ground.	  Although	  
some	  indications	  are	  positive,	  others	  suggest	  that	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  may	  not	  be	  
entirely	  ready	  to	  relinquish	  its	  role	  as	  the	  judiciary’s	  enfant	  terrible.	  
	  
I.	  A	  Shift	  in	  Focus	  
The	  Federal	  Circuit	  was	  born	  in	  a	  blaze	  of	  optimism	  in	  1982.	  With	  an	  eye	  
towards	  creating	  consistency	  and	  coherence	  in	  the	  federal	  patent	  system,	  Congress	  
created	  a	  single	  court	  of	  appeals	  that,	  among	  other	  duties,	  would	  hear	  all	  patent	  
appeals.	  
In	  the	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  early	  years,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  focused	  little	  attention	  
on	  the	  Circuit,	  reviewing	  only	  five	  patent	  cases	  in	  fifteen	  years.	  With	  complex	  
scientific	  concepts	  and	  difficult	  code-­‐like	  lingo,	  patent	  law	  is	  a	  territory	  in	  which	  few	  
generalists	  dare	  to	  tread,	  and	  the	  Justices	  may	  have	  welcomed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
focus	  their	  attention	  elsewhere.	  Despite	  great	  hope,	  however,	  coherence	  in	  patent	  
law	  has	  not	  materialized.	  Rather,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  has	  allowed	  panel	  splits	  to	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persist,	  suffered	  gaps	  in	  its	  logic,	  and	  displayed	  less	  than	  full	  fidelity	  to	  precedent.2	  
What	  is	  charming	  in	  one’s	  early	  years	  may	  become	  less	  tolerable	  across	  time,	  and	  
the	  pace	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  review	  has	  increased	  since	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium,3	  
reaching	  to	  six	  cases	  this	  term.	  Moreover,	  the	  Justices	  have	  consistently	  rebuked	  the	  
Federal	  Circuit	  for	  its	  logic.	  
	  A	  number	  of	  commentators,	  and	  even	  Federal	  Circuit	  judges	  themselves,	  
have	  characterized	  the	  message	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  a	  preference	  for	  flexible	  
tests	  over	  bright-­‐line	  rules.	  This,	  however,	  misses	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  
exhortation.	  To	  begin	  with,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  current	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  a	  
preference	  for	  balancing	  tests	  and	  flexible	  standards	  would	  be	  somewhat	  surprising	  
on	  its	  face.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  Court	  of	  prior	  decades	  in	  which	  Justice	  O’Connor,	  wielding	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  swing	  vote,	  penned	  decisions	  full	  of	  amorphous	  balancing	  tests.	  In	  
contrast,	  this	  Court	  is	  far	  more	  interested	  in	  wrapping	  its	  decisions	  in	  careful	  fidelity	  
to	  precise	  statutory	  language	  and	  legal	  precedent,	  rather	  than	  looking	  for	  more	  
open-­‐ended	  standards.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  always	  successful	  in	  
its	  desire	  for	  precision	  or	  its	  fealty	  to	  precedent.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  would	  be	  odd	  to	  
find	  a	  court	  that	  holds	  such	  aspirations	  demonstrating	  an	  aversion	  to	  rules	  and	  an	  
attraction	  to	  looser	  standards.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289, 300-01 
(2009) (discussing unresolved splits in the product-by-process doctrine and the written 
description doctrine and failure to follow precedent in patent misuse doctrine; see also 
Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision Making, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. 
L.J. 1 (2012) (describing lack of fidelity to circuit precedent and precedent from above). 
3 See Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 2 LANDSLIDE 3, 2 n.13 (2010). 
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Nor	  does	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  preference	  for	  standards	  over	  rules	  fit	  consistently	  
with	  decisions	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years4	  or	  with	  the	  underlying	  messages	  strewn	  
across	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  numerous	  patent	  decisions	  this	  term.	  Rather,	  these	  
cases	  sound	  a	  theme	  of	  restraint.5	  They	  reflect	  an	  admonition	  to	  stay	  close	  to	  
statutory	  language	  and	  to	  establish	  logic	  that	  applies	  broadly	  across	  a	  full	  range	  of	  
cases.	  In	  short,	  these	  are	  messages	  about	  coming	  into	  the	  fold	  of	  careful	  and	  precise	  
legal	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Most	  important,	  the	  cases	  this	  year	  reflect	  an	  impatience	  with	  the	  type	  of	  nice	  
distinctions	  that	  patent	  lawyers	  have	  grown	  accustomed	  to	  falling	  back	  on	  to	  justify	  
a	  client’s	  behavior—ones	  that	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  has	  readily	  accepted.	  Over	  and	  
over	  again,	  the	  message	  from	  the	  Justices	  essentially	  has	  been,	  “forget	  the	  clever	  
drafting	  and	  technical	  workarounds,	  what	  is	  really	  going	  on	  here,”6	  while	  the	  
message	  from	  the	  patent	  bar	  and	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  has	  been,	  “but	  this	  is	  how	  we	  
do	  things.”	  Consider	  the	  patentable	  subject	  matter	  case	  Alice	  v.	  CLS	  Bank.7	  In	  five	  
different	  places,	  the	  Justices	  referred	  to	  “draftsman’s	  art”	  or	  “drafting	  efforts,”	  
signaling	  loudly	  and	  clearly	  that	  the	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  legal	  doctrines	  must	  rest	  on	  
more	  than	  such	  tenuous	  grounds.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, A Comeback for the Federal Circuit: This Term, SCOTUS 
is No Longer the ‘Court of Corrections’ ABA (Sept. 1, 2011); see also Microsoft v. i4i 
Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011) (noting that the i4i decision surprised those 
expecting the Justices to choose a standard over a bright-line rule). 
5 I have noted some of these themes in a newspaper editorial, Robin Feldman, Theme of 
Restraint in Term’s IP Cases, DAILY JOURNAL (July 8, 2014). 
6 See Feldman, DAILY JOURNAL, supra note 5 (noting also that the Supreme Court echoed 
the same theme in non-patent intellectual property cases this term).  
7	  Alice	  Corp.	  Pty.	  Ltd.	  v.	  CLS	  Bank	  Int’l,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  2347	  (2014).	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The	  problem	  of	  relying	  on	  ever-­‐finer	  distinctions,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  a	  
coherent	  logical	  base,	  has	  plagued	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  for	  some	  time.	  I	  have	  
described	  this	  problem	  as	  “death by tinkering.” 8 The Circuit changes a little piece here 
and a little piece there until the entire doctrine threatens to collapse of its own weight. In 
Alice, the Justices pointedly directed the Federal Circuit to construct legal doctrine that 
did not rest on these types of drafting distinctions. 
Alice also was the case in which the Supreme Court most directly demonstrated 
its views on how such doctrines should be constructed, and it is the case that best 
illustrates the evolution of the Supreme Court’s messaging from hints, to conversation, to 
commands. Alice was the fourth in a series of Supreme Court cases on patentable subject 
matter since 2010. In the first case, Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that the sole test for patentable subject matter should be the 
“machine or transformation test.” It probably did not help the Federal Circuit that the 
Circuit had been continually citing a Supreme Court decision in which the Court 
explicitly declined to adopt that approach as the sole method.9  
Across a fractured set of opinions, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices ruled 
in Bilski that machine-or-transformation, while a useful clue, certainly was not the sole 
test for determining subject matter patentability.	  The majority dribbled out a variety of 
hints about the proper manner of constructing legal doctrine,10 as well as hints about the 
Justices’ displeasure over the Federal Circuit’s decision-making. Displaying a startlingly 
strong rebuke of Federal Circuit jurisprudence, the Bilski majority stated that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Feldman, Conversation, supra note 2.  
9 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (noting that the Federal Circuit had 
incorrectly concluded that the Court had endorsed the machine-or-transformation test). 
10 See Feldman, Conversation, supra note 2. 
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Nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of section 
101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past.11 
 
In other words, the Justices suggested that they disagreed with everything the Federal 
Circuit had ever said about this area of patent law in the Circuit’s 30-year history.12 That 
is a remarkable statement.  
 The Justices, however, did not set delineate a specific test for the Federal Circuit 
to follow. In the most charitable light, one could say that the Supreme Court intended 
that, having offered wisdom on the proper outlines of the doctrine and the proper 
approach to decision-making, it gave the Federal Circuit an opportunity to flesh out a 
proper test as the Circuit saw fit.  A cynic might suggest, that the exceedingly fractured 
Supreme Court decision in Bilski indicated the Justices themselves had no solution.13 
 Granting the Federal Circuit another opportunity to define a workable test for 
patentable subject matter, however, produced unsatisfying results for the Supreme Court. 
Upon reversing Bilski, the Supreme Court remanded, Mayo, sending it back for 
reconsideration. Mayo concerned a patent on a medical diagnostic method, specifically, a 
method of calibrating the proper dosage of certain medicines for gastrointestinal disorder. 
The Federal Circuit concluded on remand that the machine or transformation test 
remained the proper test under the circumstances and that the invention satisfied the test. 
The Federal Circuit’s new decision contained minor logical additions, but remained 
essentially unchanged from its decision prior to remand. In response, the Supreme Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
12 See Feldman, supra note 2. 
13 The Justices wrote three separate opinions, with two opinions oddly bifurcated and 
Justice Scalia serving as the swing vote.  
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reversed the Federal Circuit’s Mayo decision, as well as soundly rejecting the circuit’s 
analysis.14  
Upon reversing Mayo, the Supreme Court remanded another Federal Circuit 
decision on patentable subject matter, this one related to patentability of isolated gene 
sequences.15 Once again, the Supreme Court gave the Federal Circuit an opportunity to 
reconsider its decision in light of the Court’s guidance, and once again, the Supreme 
Court reversed and rejected the Federal Circuit’s attempts. 
 Finally, in Alice, the Supreme Court gave up and delineated its own rule on 
patentable subject matter, one derived from the language of its own prior decisions in the 
area. Alice concerned a software patent on a form of computerized escrow accounts. 
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit panel of ten judges produced seven different opinions, 
disagreeing on whether some of the patent claims might constitute patentable subject 
matter and what the analysis should be. No single opinion drew more than a plurality, 
outside of a one paragraph per curiam opinion. 
 In its own Alice opinion, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for 
distinguishing ineligible patents that merely claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas from eligible patents that appropriately claim applications of those 
basic building blocks. The first step involves determining whether the patent claim is 
directed to one of the ineligible categories, such as an abstract idea. The second step 
involves looking at any additional elements in the claim to see if the core of what is 
new—the “inventive concept”—adds enough. In particular, the Court noted that simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
15 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, is not enough to 
supply an appropriate inventive concept.16 
 The series of patentable subject matter cases, culminating with Alice, was not 
simply about rules versus standards. In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-
transformation rule, the Supreme Court tried repeatedly to coax the Federal Circuit into 
developing a test that would be broadly applicable and logically defensible. Machine or 
transformation, for all of its bright-line qualities, required considerable hand waiving, and 
one also had to suspend a certain amount of disbelief to overlook the logical 
discrepancies.17  
 The problem with the Federal Circuit’s series of failed tests in the area of 
patentable subject matter lies not with the notion of having a test or a bright-line rule. The 
problem lies with forgetting the goal of why one is developing a test in the first place. 
Any test is no more than a proxy for the concepts embodied in the notion of patentable 
subject matter, which can be understood broadly as ensuring that the subject matter of a 
patent does not pose pre-emption problems.18 It is not that everything embodied in the 
Federal Circuit’s proxies was wrong or that the notion of developing a proxy itself is 
wrong. The danger is that one can forget what the proxy is testing for and allow that 
proxy to take on a life of its own, disembodied from the underlying concepts.19 This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1292). 
17 For a discussion of problems with various bright-line tests the Federal Circuit has tried 
for patentable subject matter, see ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 113-124 
(Harvard University Press 2012). 
18 See Mayo v. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (noting that the exceptions to patentable 
subject matter serve as a “proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern”). 
19 For a further discussion of this concept, see Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Robin 
Feldman and the U.C. Hastings Institute for Innovation Law on Behalf of Neither Party at 
19-22, Alice v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 343177. 
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what the Supreme Court tried to communicate to the Federal Circuit as it tried to coax the 
Circuit into creating a logically consistent test for patentable subject matter. 
 The Court delivered a similar message about logical consistency in this term’s 
decision in Limelight v. Akamai.20 In a prior case, the Federal Circuit had held that a 
defendant was not liable for directly infringing a patented method because the defendant 
there did not control all steps of the method itself.21 Similarly, the defendant in Akamai 
also did not perform or control all the steps in the method patent.  
In its en banc ruling in Akamai, the Federal Circuit declined to revisit its direct 
earlier infringement decision but found the defendant liable for indirect infringement 
instead. The en banc court accepted the principle that there can be no finding of indirect 
infringement without a finding of direct infringement. However, employing remarkably 
creative logic, the Federal Circuit ruled that requiring proof that direct infringement has 
occurred is not the same as requiring that anyone would be liable for that infringement. 
 The Supreme Court was unmoved by the Federal Circuit’s creativity. Reversing 
and remanding, the Justices commented that the “Federal Circuit’s analysis 
fundamentally misunderstands what it means to infringe a method patent.”22 It is an odd 
moment indeed when the Supreme Court feels moved to explain patent infringement to 
the dedicated patent court of appeals.  
 The Supreme Court’s Akamai decision essentially invited the Federal Circuit to 
revisit its prior decision regarding indirect infringement. The message was clear. Judges 
cannot solve a problem in one doctrinal area by twisting another set of doctrines. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Limelight	  Networks,	  Inc.	  v.	  Akamai	  Techs.,	  Inc.	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  2111,	  2120	  (2014).	  
21 See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (2008). 
22 Akamai, 134 S. Ct. at 2117. 
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rules of convenience inevitably collapse of their own weight, and the Federal Circuit 
must develop a more supportable logical base.  
 The Alice and Akamai decisions also echo another significant theme from this 
year. Much of the Federal Circuit’s tinkering over the decades has been in the service of 
an expansive interpretation of patent law and patent holder rights. In case after case this 
term, however, the Supreme Court cut back on the broad roaming range that patent 
holders have come to enjoy and expect from the Federal Circuit. For example, in Nautilus 
v. Biosig,23 the Supreme Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s rule that claims are 
permitted to be ambiguous as long as they are not “insoluably ambiguous.” The Federal 
Circuit’s rule had ensured that very few patents could ever be overturned for 
indefiniteness. 
 Similarly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronics v. Mirowski24 ensured an 
increase in challenges to existing patents. Ordinarily, a patent holder bears the burden of 
proving that a patent is valid in an infringement case. The Federal Circuit had ruled, 
however, that the burden of proof shifts away from the patent holder when one who holds 
a license brings a declaratory judgment action against the patent holder. The Supreme 
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s burden shift, holding that the burden remains with the 
patent owner. 
 The final two companion cases, Octane and Highmark continued the theme of 
cutting back on the power of the patent holder and contained the strongest rebuke of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2123 (2014). 
24 Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
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Federal Circuit this year.25 These cases concerned the Patent Act’s provision that a court 
may award attorneys fees in “exceptional cases.” In interpreting the provision, the 
Federal Circuit had set a tremendously high bar, importing a standard from antitrust law 
to hold that a trial court may award attorneys fees only if the litigation is both “brought in 
subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” This standard ensured that fee shifting 
would be applied in few, if any, cases. 
 Once again, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s test, ruling instead 
that an exceptional patent case is one that stands out from others, whether by the 
weakness of the arguments or the litigation strategy. The Justices overturned the Federal 
Circuit on the evidence standard as well, ruling that those asking for attorney’s fees may 
establish their case by “a preponderance of the evidence” rather than meeting the higher 
standard of “clear and convincing evidence.”  
Finally, the Supreme Court severely limited the Federal Circuit’s ability to 
overturn a trial court’s decision on the award of attorney’s fees. The Justices held that the 
Federal Circuit could reverse a trial judge only for abuse of discretion, rather than 
applying a de novo standard of review, as the Federal Circuit had. In short, in the 
companion cases of Octane and Highmark, the Supreme Court said to the Federal Circuit, 
“you are wrong and you are out of the game.”26 
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s loudest message of all echoes through the lineup of 
signatures on the opinions. Every one of the six Supreme Court patent opinions this term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Octane Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark, 
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
26 Feldman, DAILY JOURNAL, supra note 5. 
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was delivered unanimously.27 This stands in sharp contrast to the Federal Circuit’s 
disarray—epitomized by Alice, in which the ten en banc judges managed to file seven 
separate opinions, and one per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court’s careful unanimity 
was an unmistakable message to the Federal Circuit to get its judicial house in order. 
 
II. What Lies Ahead 
 
 Although the most recent Supreme Court term ended mere months ago, there are 
some positive signs that the Federal Circuit is taking heed. Consider the recent Federal 
Circuit decision in buySAFE v. Google.28  The patent related to a computerized method 
for guaranteeing that parties perform their obligations in online transactions. Oral 
argument in the case took place before the Supreme Court handed down the Alice 
decision. The panel included then Chief Judge Rader, who had yet to step down from the 
bench. In a series of heated exchanges with the attorney challenging the patent, Judge 
Rader suggested support for the patent claims and expressed thinly veiled criticism of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 101 of the Patent Act, which defines patentable 
subject matter: 
You say 101, but of course you are not talking about 101, are you . . . [y]ou mean 
the judicial exception to 101. . . . If we just apply the statute, you lose.29 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In one minor exception, Justice Scalia signed the Court’s opinion but declined to sign 
three footnotes, on the principle of not citing certain forms of legislative history. See 
Octane, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
28 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 2013-1575, 2014 WL 4337771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 
2014). 
29 See Scott Graham, After Testy Argument, Patent Appeal Becomes Easy Call in 
Google’s Favor, THE RECORDER (Sept. 3, 2014). For audio recording, see 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/2013-1575/all 
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The attorney responded, “101 as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.”30 
 The opinion that issued from the Federal Circuit, however, showed careful 
deference to the Supreme Court’s authority and to its precedents. Perhaps in quiet 
response to the panel’s now departed colleague, the two remaining panel members began 
their analysis by noting that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant section of 
the Patent Act extends back 150 years.31 The panelists then quickly found the patent 
claims ineligible under Section 101. “Given the new Supreme Court authority in this 
delicate area, and the simplicity of the present case under that authority, there is no need 
to parse our own precedents here. . . . it is  a straightforward matter to conclude that the 
claims in the case are invalid.32 
 The buySAFE opinion was written by two newer members of the Federal Circuit 
and follows on the heels of another panel decision invalidating a software patent.33 The 
language stands in contrast to other moments in which the Federal Circuit pushed back on 
Supreme Court mandates.34  
 The response of Federal Circuit judges to the Octane and Highmark decisions, 
however, has been less encouraging. In those cases, the Supreme Court overturned the 
Federal Circuit’s test for awarding attorney’s fees and held further that the Federal 
Circuit may only review a trial court’s fee decision for abuse of discretion. The cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Id. 
31 buySAFE, 2014 WL 4337771, at 2-3. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
32 Id. at 4-5. 
33	  See	  Planet	  Bingo,	  LLC	  v.	  VKGS	  LLC,	  No.	  2013-­‐1663	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  Aug.	  26,	  2014).	  
34 See, e.g., text accompanying notes, supra (describing the Federal Circuit’s response on 
remand in the Mayo case); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. 234 F.3d 
558, 598 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Michel, J. dissenting) (arguing that although the Supreme 
Court encouraged the Federal Circuit to refine the test for the doctrine of equivalents, the 
Circuit’s new rule “far from being merely a refinement, contravenes consistent Supreme 
Court authority”).  
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interpreted the Patent Act language that a court “in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”35 
Various Federal Circuit judges, however, appear to be unwilling to retreat to the 
sidelines.  In remanding the Octane case to the trial judge to apply the Supreme Court’s 
new test, the Federal Circuit could not resist the opportunity to instruct the lower court on 
what it should do. In particular, the panel reminded the lower court that under Federal 
Circuit precedent, a trial court does not have to award fees in exceptional cases: 
 
The Supreme Court  . . . did not, however, revoke the discretion of a district court 
to deny fee awards even in exceptional cases. Long before Brooks Furniture 
[repudiated by the Supreme Court in Octane], we held that an exceptional case 
does not require in all circumstances the award of attorneys fees.36 
 
Thus, having been told to get out of the game, the Federal Circuit used a large bullhorn to 
tell trial courts that just because the Supreme Court says you are allowed to award fees, it 
doesn’t mean you have to.  
The Federal Circuit may be correct on the legal issues. Nevertheless, having been 
told to leave this to the trial courts, it is somewhat unseemly for the judges to reach out in 
this way. Such action hints at the old Federal Circuit intransigence to Supreme Court, or 
any other, authority. 
Similarly awkward has been the fact that two Federal Circuit judges, sitting by 
designation as trial court judges, have denied fee award motions since Octane. 37 This is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See 35 U.S.C. 285. 
36 ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 2011-1521, -1636, slip op. at 
5-6. (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2014) (nonprecedential disposition). 
37 Stragent, LLC v. Intel, Corp. Case No. 6:11-cv-421 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014); Sabatino 
Bianco, M.D., v. Globus Medical, Inc., Case No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014 WL 
1904228 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2014). 
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somewhat delicate area. Sitting by designation on another court is a time-honored 
practice specifically permitted by statute. Moreover, both of the Circuit judges were 
seated as trial court judges in these cases before the Supreme Court handed down its 
Octane opinion, although after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari. Nevertheless, 
these opinions raise the possibility of the appearance that Federal Circuit judges are 
trying to resist Supreme Court precedent by moving to the trial courts to shape the 
decision-making. The language of the opinions themselves does not dispel that notion.  
For example, in Stragent v. Intel, the jury found that the defendant had not 
infringed the patents and that the patents were invalid, in any event. In its motion for 
attorney’s fees following the Octane decision, the defendant’s lawyer described the 
patent holder as “a habitual litigant,” and noted that while it had taken the jury a mere 
three hours to reject the patent holder’s claims, the defendant had to spend $9 million 
dollars defending the case.38 Judge Dyk noted that the patent holder’s infringement 
argument “was certainly a weak one,” but declined to grant attorney’s fees on the 
grounds that the defendant had not asked for summary judgment on infringement.39  
Judge Bryson similarly focused on the summary judgment stage in denying 
attorney’s fees in the other case, Globus Medical. Although noting that losing a summary 
judgment motion is not dispositive of whether a patent holder’s arguments are baseless, 
the judge ruled that such a loss supports the notion that the argument was not frivolous.40 
Together, the two opinions set the stage for a new early bar on attorney’s fees: lose the 
summary judgment motion, and the question of fees is now off the table. Such a flat bar, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Scott Graham, Federal Circuit Judges Put Spin on Patent Fee-Shifting, THE 
RECORDER (August 16, 2014). 
39 See Stragent v. Intel, slip op. at 9-10. 
40 See Bianco v. Globus Medical, slip op. at 4. 
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again operating to protect the patent holder, stands in contrast to the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that trial judges should look at the totality of the circumstances in deciding 
whether the case is exceptional. 
Judge Bryson’s opinion in Global Medical was troubling in other aspects as well. 
The judge originally denied attorney’s fees prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Octane. In Octane, the Supreme Court very clearly rejected the Federal Circuit’s test that 
a defendant must meet both parts of a two-part test, rejecting the test as “superimposing 
an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible,” completely 
replacing the test with its own formulation.41 Rehearing the motion under the Supreme 
Court’s new standard, Judge Bryson, however, concluded that his original decision was 
correct, repeating his analysis under the prior test. The judge noted that meeting all 
aspects of the prior test essentially satisfied the Supreme Court’s new test, and then 
briefly noted that he had made an independent determination that attorney’s fees also are 
unwarranted based on the totality of the circumstances.  
This approach is reminiscent of the Mayo case described above, in which the 
Supreme Court remanded after a new test, the Federal Circuit concluded that it’s original 
decision had been correct, and the Supreme Court had to step in again. It is also 
reminiscent of prior two-steps in which the Supreme Court rejects and instructs, and the 
Federal Circuit responds by concluding that its old approach essentially satisfies the 
Supreme Court’s new mandate. 
Most troubling was Judge Bryson’s alternative ground for denying the 
“exceptional case” motion—namely, that the defendant had waived its right to the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Octane v. Icon, slip op. at 7-8. 
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test Octane test. The defendant in Globus Medical was not a party in the Octane case. 
Nevertheless, Judge Bryson held that by failing to argue based on the standard proposed 
by one of the parties in Octane, the defendant waived its right to ask for the new standard 
when the Supreme Court eventually adopted it.  
That conclusion is puzzling on many levels. In particular, is it rational to expect a 
party, facing a Federal Circuit judge sitting as the trial judge, to argue that the Federal 
Circuit is wrong and will surely be overturned by the Supreme Court any minute? This 
type of approach, in which hyper-technical lines are stretched to fit the circumstances of 
the case, generally in the service of supporting the patent holder, represents the Federal 
Circuit of old. If this is what the Supreme Court has tried to wean the Federal Circuit 
away from, the fee award cases are not a good sign. 
In general, if the Supreme Court is unsuccessful in prodding the Federal Circuit 
into maturity, there is always a risk that the appellate court could be kicked out of the 
federal courthouse for good. Although the likelihood is low, public attention increasingly 
is focused on patents, and the nation could conceivably end its historic experiment of 
creating a unified patent court. After all, thirty-five years old is a bit late for a coming of 
age. 
 
  
	  
	  
